Kahneman and Tversky's heuristics and biases

Source: en.wikipedia.org · 11 items in the source's own order.

1. 1The representativeness heuristic → Representativeness heuristic
   Judging probability by how closely something resembles a typical example, while ignoring base rates and sample size.
2. 2The availability heuristic → Availability heuristic
   Judging how likely or frequent something is by how easily examples come to mind, so vivid, recent or emotional events get overweighted.
3. 3Anchoring and adjustment → Anchoring
   Relying too heavily on the first number or piece of information encountered (the anchor) and adjusting too little from it.
4. 4Framing effects → Framing effect
   Reacting differently to the same facts depending on how they are presented, for instance as a gain or a loss, a percentage or a count.
5. 5Attribute substitution
   Answering a hard question by unconsciously answering an easier one that feels related.
6. 6What you see is all there is
   Kahneman's phrase for building the most coherent story from whatever information is at hand, without asking what is missing.
7. 7Conjunction fallacy (the Linda problem) → Conjunction fallacy
   Judges a combination of events as more probable than one of them alone, though a conjunction can never be more likely than either part.
8. 8Overconfidence and the illusion of validity → Overconfidence effect
   Being more certain of our judgments, knowledge and forecasts than their accuracy justifies.
9. 9Loss aversion (prospect theory) → Loss aversion
   Feeling a loss roughly twice as strongly as an equal gain, which makes us cling to what we have and avoid risk when ahead.
10. 10The planning fallacy → Planning fallacy
    Underestimating the time, cost and risk of our own plans while knowing similar plans overran, because we picture the best case.
11. 11The affect heuristic → Affect heuristic
    Letting how we feel about something ("good" or "bad") stand in for a judgment of its risks and benefits.

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